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DOMINATING COUNTABLY MANY FORECASTS
By M. J. Schervish, Teddy Seidenfeld and J. B. Kadane
Carnegie Mellon University
We investigate differences between a simple Dominance Principle
applied to sums of fair prices for variables and dominance applied
to sums of forecasts for variables scored by proper scoring rules. In
particular, we consider differences when fair prices and forecasts cor-
respond to finitely additive expectations and dominance is applied
with infinitely many prices and/or forecasts.
1. Introduction. The requirement that preferences are coherent aims to
make rigorous the idea that elementary restrictions on rational preferences
entail that personal probabilities satisfy the axioms of mathematical prob-
ability. This use of coherence as a justification of personal probability is
very well illustrated by de Finetti’s (1974) approach to the foundations of
probability. De Finetti distinguished two senses of coherence: coherence1 and
coherence2. Coherence1 requires that probabilistic forecasts for random vari-
ables (he calls them previsions) do not lead to a finite set of fair contracts
that, together, are uniformly dominated by abstaining. Coherence2 requires
that a finite set of probabilistic forecasts cannot be uniformly dominated
under Brier (squared error) score by a rival set of forecasts. He showed that
these two senses of coherence are equivalent in the following sense. Each ver-
sion of coherence results in using the expectation of a random variable as its
forecast. Moreover, these expectations are based on a finitely additive prob-
ability without requiring that personal probability is countably additive.
[In Appendix A, we explain what we mean by expectations with respect to
finitely additive probabilities. These are similar in many ways, but not iden-
tical to integrals in the sense of Dunford and Schwartz (1958), Chapter III.]
Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (2009) extended this equivalence to in-
clude a large class of strictly proper scoring rules (not just Brier score) but
for events only. The corresponding extension to general random variables
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is included in the supplemental article [Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane
(2014)]. Here, we refer to the extended sense of coherence2 as coherence3.
We investigate asymmetries between coherence1 and coherence3 reflecting
differences between cases where personal probabilities are countably additive
and where personal probabilities are finitely (but not countably) additive.
We give conditions where coherence3 may be applied to assessing countably
many forecasts at once, but where coherence1 cannot be applied to com-
bining infinitely many fair contracts. Also, we study conditional forecasts
given elements of a partition π, where the conditional forecasts are based on
the conditional probabilities given elements of π. Each coherence criterion
is violated by combining infinitely many conditional forecasts when those
conditional forecasts are not conglomerable (see Definition 7) in the parti-
tion π. Neither criterion is violated by combining infinitely many conditional
forecasts when conditional expectations satisfy the law of total previsions
(see Definition 8) in π.
2. Results of de Finetti. Coherence of preference, as de Finetti [(1974),
Chapter 3] formulates it, is the criterion that a rational decision maker
respects uniform (strict) dominance. In Section 2.1, we explain the version
of the Dominance Principle that de Finetti uses. In Section 2.2, we review de
Finetti’s two versions of coherence, with a focus on how preferences based
on a finitely additive probability are coherent.
2.1. Dominance. Let Ω be a set. The elements of Ω will be called states
and denoted ω. Random variables are real-valued functions with domain Ω,
which we denote with capital letters. Let I index a set of options. Consider
a hypothetical decision problem O specified by a set of exclusive options
O = {Oi : i ∈ I}. Each option Oi is a random variable with the following
interpretation: If ω is the state which occurs, then Oi(ω) denotes the decision
maker’s loss (negative of cardinal utility) for choosing option Oi. The values
of Oi (for all i ∈ I) are defined up to a common positive affine transformation.
Definition 1. Let Oi and Oj be two options from O. If there exists an
ε > 0 such that for each ω ∈Ω, Oj(ω)>Oi(ω)+ ε, then option Oi uniformly
strictly dominates Oj . If, for each ω, Oj(ω)>Oi(ω), we say that Oi simply
dominates Oj .
Uniform strict dominance is clearly stricter than simple dominance. As
we explain, next, in order to permit preferences based on maximizing finitely
(and not necessarily countably) additive expectations, de Finetti used the
following Dominance Principle, rather than some other more familiar con-
cepts of admissibility, for example, simple dominance. There are additional
ways to define dominance, which we discuss further in Section 6.
Dominance Principle: Let Oi and Oj be options in O. If Oi uniformly
(strictly) dominates Oj , then Oj is an inadmissible choice from O.
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2.2. Coherence1 and coherence2. De Finetti [(1974), Chapter 3] formu-
lated two criteria of coherence that are based on the Dominance Principle.
Throughout this paper, we follow the convention of identifying events with
their indicator functions.
Definition 2. A conditional prevision (or conditional forecast) P (X|H)
for a random variable X given a nonempty event H is a fair price for buying
and selling X in the sense that, for all real α, the option that costs the
agent αH[X − P (X|H)] is considered fair. [We call P (X|Ω) an uncondi-
tional prevision and denote it P (X).] A collection {P (Xi|Hi) : i ∈ I} of such
conditional forecasts is coherent1 if, for every finite subset {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ I
and all real α1, . . . , αn, there exists no ε > 0 such that
n∑
j=1
αjHij(ω)[Xij (ω)− P (Xij |Hij )]≥ ε
for all ω ∈Ω.
A collection of conditional forecasts is coherent2 if no sum of finitely many
(Brier score) penalties can be uniformly strictly dominated in the partition
of states by the sum of penalties from a rival set of forecasts for the same ran-
dom variables. That is, for every finite subset {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ I , all alternative
forecasts qi1 , . . . , qin , and all positive α1, . . . , αn, there is no ε > 0 such that
n∑
j=1
αjHij(ω)[Xij (ω)−P (Xij |Hij)]2 ≥
n∑
j=1
αjHij (ω)[Xij (ω)− qij ]2 + ε
for all ω.
De Finetti [(1974), pages 88–89] proved that a decision maker who wishes
to be both coherent1 and coherent2 must choose the same forecasts for both
purposes. He also proved that the decision maker’s coherent1 forecasts are
represented by a finitely additive personal probability, P (·), in the sense of
Definition 3 below.
If P (H) = 0, then coherence1 and coherence2 place no restrictions on
P (X|H) for bounded X . Nevertheless, it is possible and useful to make
certain intuitive assumptions about conditional forecasts given events with
0 probability. In particular, Theorems 3 and 4 of this paper assume that
P (·|H) is a finitely additive expectation (in the sense of Definition 10 in
Appendix A) satisfying P (X|H) = P (HX|H) for all H and X . This as-
sumption holds whenever P (H)> 0, and it captures the idea that P (·|H) is
concentrated on H . De Finetti [(1975), Appendix 16] introduces an axiom
that places a similar requirement on conditional previsions. See Levi (1980),
Section 5.6, and Regazzini (1987) for other ways to augment the coherence
criteria of Definition 2 in order to satisfy these added requirements on condi-
tional previsions given a null event. Rather than adding such requirements
to the definition of coherence, we prefer that individual agents who wish
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to adopt them do so as explicit additional assumptions. Example 2 in the
supplemental article [Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (2014)] illustrates
our reason for such a preference. In this way, our definition of coherence is
slightly weaker than that of de Finetti.
As an aside, the meaning of conditional expected value in the finitely-
additive theory differs from its meaning in the countably-additive theory
in this one major regard: In the finitely-additive theory a conditional ex-
pectation can be specified given an arbitrary nonempty event, regardless of
whether that event has positive probability. A conditional expectation of a
bounded random variable given an event with zero probability is not defined
uniquely in terms of unconditional expectations, but Dubins (1975) shows
that, in the finitely additive theory, conditional expectations can be defined
on the set of bounded random variables so that they are finitely additive
expectations. In the countably-additive theory, conditional expectation is
defined twice: given events with positive probability and given σ-fields. The
two definitions match in a well-defined way, and both provide uniquely de-
fined conditional expectations in terms of unconditional expectations.
Definition 3. A probability P (·) is finitely additive provided that,
when events F and G are disjoint, that is, when F ∩ G = ∅, then P (F ∪
G) = P (F ) +P (G). A probability is countably additive provided that when
Fi (i= 1, . . .) is a denumerable sequence of pairwise disjoint events, that is,
when Fi∩Fj =∅ if i 6= j, then P (
⋃∞
i=1Fi) =
∑∞
i=1P (Fi). We call a probabil-
ity P merely finitely additive when P is finitely but not countably additive.
Likewise, then its P -expectations are merely finitely additive.
For each pair X and Y of random variables with finite previsions (expec-
tations), P (X + Y ) = P (X) + P (Y ). For countably additive expectations
and countably many random variables {Xi}∞i=1, conditions under which
P (
∑∞
i=1Xi) =
∑∞
i=1P (Xi) can be derived from various theorems such as
the monotone convergence theorem, the dominated convergence theorem,
Fubini’s theorem and Tonelli’s theorem.
De Finetti (1981) recognized that coherence2 (but not coherence1) pro-
vided an incentive compatible solution to the problem of mechanism design
for eliciting a coherent set of personal probabilities. Specifically, Brier score
is a strictly proper scoring rule, as defined here.
Definition 4. A scoring rule for coherent forecasts of a random variable
X is a real-valued loss function g with two real arguments: a value of the
random variable and a forecast q. Let Pg be the collection of probability
distributions such that P (X) is finite and P [g(X,q)] is finite for at least
one q. We say that g is proper if, for every probability P ∈ Pg, P [g(X,q)] is
minimized (as a function of q) by q = P (X). If, in addition, only the quantity
q = P (X) minimizes expected score, then the scoring rule is strictly proper.
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The following trivial result connects proper scoring rules with conditional
distributions.
Proposition 1. If H is a nonempty event and P (·|H) is a probability
distribution then P [g(X,q)|H] is (uniquely) minimized by q = P (X|H) if g
is (strictly) proper.
Some authors reserve the qualification strictly proper for scoring rules
that are designed to elicit an entire distribution, rather than just the mean
of a distribution. [See Gneiting (2011a), who calls the latter kind strictly
consistent.] For the remainder of this paper, we follow the language of Defi-
nition 4, which matches the usage in Gneiting (2011b).
We present some background on strictly proper scoring rules in Section 3.
Section 4 gives our main results. We discuss propriety of scoring rules for
infinitely many forecasts in Section 5.
3. Background on strictly proper scoring rules. In this section, we in-
troduce a large class of strictly proper scoring rules that we use as gener-
alizations of Brier score. Associated with this class, we introduce a third
coherence concept that generalizes coherence2.
Definition 5. Let C be a class of strictly proper scoring rules. Let
{(Xi,Hi) : i ∈ I} be a collection of random variable/nonempty event pairs
with corresponding conditional forecasts {pi : i ∈ I}. The forecasts are
coherent3 relative to C if, for every finite subset {ij : j = 1, . . . , n} ⊆ I , ev-
ery set of scoring rules {gj}nj=1 ⊆ C, and every set {qj}nj=1 of alternative
forecasts, there is no ε > 0 such that
n∑
j=1
Hij(ω)gj(Xij (ω), pij )≥
n∑
j=1
Hij (ω)gj(Xij (ω), qj) + ε
for all ω. That is, no sum of finitely many scores can be uniformly strictly
dominated by the sum of scores from rival forecasts.
Coherence2 is the special case of coherence3 in which C consists solely
of Brier score. The supplemental article [Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane
(2014)] includes a proof that, if C consists of strictly proper scoring rules of
the form (1) below, then coherence3 relative to C is equivalent to coherence1.
The general form of scoring rule that we will consider is
g(x, q) =


∫ q
x
(v− x)dλ(v), if x≤ q,∫ x
q
(x− v)dλ(v), if x > q,
(1)
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where λ is a measure that is mutually absolutely continuous with Lebesgue
measure and is finite on every bounded interval. It is helpful to rewrite (1)
as
g(x, q) =
∫ x
q
(x− v)dλ(v),(2)
using the convention that an integral whose limits are in the wrong order
equals the negative of the integral with the limits in the correct order. An-
other interesting way to rewrite (1), using the same convention, is
g(x, q) = λ((q, x))[x− r(x, q, λ)],(3)
where, for all a and b,
r(a, b, λ) =
∫ b
a v dλ(v)
λ((a, b))
.(4)
An immediate consequence of (3) is that, if p and q are real numbers, then
g(x, q)− g(x, p) = λ((q, p))[x− r(q, p, λ)].(5)
The form (1) is suggested by equation (4.3) of Savage (1971). Each such
scoring rule is finite, nonnegative and continuous as a function of (x, q).
If we wanted to consider only countably additive distributions, we could
use a larger class of scoring rules by allowing λ to be an infinite measure
supported on a bounded interval (c1, c2). But this relaxation would allow
functions g that are not strictly proper for natural classes of finitely additive
distributions. Example 1 below illustrates this point. Lemma 1 justifies the
use of (1) as the form of our scoring rules. The proofs of all results in the
body of the paper are given in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. Let g be a scoring rule of the form (1). Then g is strictly
proper.
It follows from (3) that, if λ is a probability measure with finite mean,
then Pg from Definition 4 is the class of all finitely additive distributions
with finite mean because λ((q, x)) and λ((q, x))r(q, x,λ) are both bounded
functions of q and x. Even if λ is not a finite measure, (5) implies that, if
P [g(X,q0)] is finite, then h(x, p) = g(x, p) − g(x, q0) is linear in x so that
h(x, p) is also strictly proper with Ph equal to the class of all probabilities
with finite mean. For example, if g(x, p) = (x − p)2, namely Brier score,
then Pg is the set of distributions with finite second moment. However,
h(x, p) = (x − p)2 − x2 has Ph equal to the class of all probabilities with
finite mean.
Let f(·) denote the Radon–Nikodym derivative of λ with respect to Lebes-
gue measure. Some familiar examples of strictly proper scoring rules are
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recovered by setting f equal to specific functions. Brier score corresponds
to f(v)≡ 2. Logarithmic score on the interval (c1, c2) corresponds to f(v) =
(c2 − c1)/[(c2 − v)(v − c1)], but the corresponding measure is infinite on
(c1, c2). Hence, logarithmic score is not of the form (1). In addition, if g is this
logarithmic score, then Pg does not include all finitely additive distributions
that take values in the bounded interval (c1, c2), as the following example
illustrates.
Example 1. Let X be a random variable whose entire distribution is
agglutinated at c1 from above. That is, let P (X > c1) = 1 and P (X < c1 +
ε) = 1 for all ε > 0. Let g be the logarithmic scoring rule that uses f(v) from
above. Then P (X) = c1, but g(X(ω), c1) =∞ for all ω, which could not have
finite mean even if we tried to extend the definition of random variables to
allow them to assume infinite values. On the other hand, for c1 < q < c2,
the mean of g(X,q) is log[(c2 − c1)/(c2 − q)] > 0, which decreases to 0 as
q decreases to c1, and is always finite. So, Pg is nonempty but does not
contain P .
Some of our results rely on one or another condition that prevents the
λ measures that determine the scoring rules from either being too heavily
concentrated on small sets or from being too different from each other.
Definition 6. Let C = {gi : i ∈ I} be a collection of strictly proper scor-
ing rules of the form (1) with corresponding measures {λi : i ∈ I}.
(i) Suppose that, for every ε≥ 0, there exists δε > 0 such that for all i ∈ I
and all real a < b, λi((a, b))> ε implies a+ δε ≤ r(a, b, λi)≤ b− δε. Then we
say that the collection C satisfies the uniform spread condition.
(ii) Suppose that, for every ε > 0 and every i ∈ I , there exists γi,ε > 0 such
that for all j ∈ I and all real a < b, λi((a, b)) ≥ ε implies λj((a, b)) ≥ γi,ε.
Then we say that the collection C satisfies the uniform similarity condition.
The r(a, b, λ) in (4) can be thought of as the mean of the probability
measure on the interval (a, b) obtained by normalizing λ on the interval.
The uniform spread condition insures that, the λ measures are spread out
enough to keep the means of the normalized measures on intervals far enough
away from both endpoints.
The next result gives sufficient conditions for both the uniform similarity
and uniform spread conditions. It is easy to see that the conditions are
logically independent of each other.
Lemma 2. Let C = {gi : i ∈ I} be a collection of strictly proper scoring
rules of the form (1) with corresponding measures {λi : i ∈ I} and corre-
sponding Radon–Nikodym derivatives {fi : i ∈ i} with respect to Lebesgue
measure.
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(i) Assume that there exists U <∞ such that fi(v) ≤ U , for all v and
all i ∈ I. Then C satisfies the uniform spread condition.
(ii) Assume that for every i ∈ I, there exists Li > 0 such that fj(v)/fi(v)≥
Li, for all v and all j ∈ I. Then C satisfies the uniform similarity condition.
As an example, suppose that each λi is αi > 0 times Lebesgue measure. If
the αi are bounded above, then C satisfies the uniform spread condition. If
the αi are bounded away from 0, then C satisfies the uniform similarity con-
dition. These sets of measures correspond to multiples of Brier score. There
are collections that satisfy the uniform spread condition without satisfying
the conditions of part (i) of Lemma 2. For example, let f(v) = |v|−1/2/2
which is not bounded above. For this f , we have λ((a, b)) = |
√
|b| −
√
|a|| if
0 /∈ (a, b), and λ((a, b)) =
√
|a|+
√
|b| if 0 ∈ (a, b). So λ((a, b))2 is no larger
than two times the distance between a and b. Also, r(a, b, λ) is always at
least 1/3 of the way from both a and b. We can add the corresponding scor-
ing rule to any class that already satisfies the uniform spread condition by
(if necessary) lowering δε to ε
2/6.
4. Extensions to countably many options. In Section 4.1, we investigate
when each sense of coherence can be extended to allow combining count-
ably many forecasts into a single act by summing together their individual
outcomes. In Section 4.2, we introduce the concept of conditional forecasts
and present results about the combination of countably many coherent con-
ditional forecasts.
4.1. Dominance for countably many forecasts. Let {Xi}∞i=1 be a count-
able set of random variables with corresponding coherent1 unconditional
previsions {pi}∞i=1. Let {αi}∞i=1 be a sequence of real numbers. The decision
maker’s net loss in state ω, from adding the individual losses from the fair
options αi[Xi(ω)− pi] is
∞∑
i=1
αi[Xi(ω)− pi].(6)
Similarly, if the agent’s prevision pi for Xi is scored by the strictly proper
scoring rule gi for each i, the total score in each state ω equals
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), pi).
We assume that each of the two series above are convergent for all ω ∈Ω.
Example 2 (Combining countably many forecasts). De Finetti [(1972),
page 91] noted that when the decision maker’s personal probability is merely
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finitely additive, she/he cannot always accept as fair the countable sum (6)
determined by coherent1 forecasts. That sum may be uniformly dominated
by abstaining. Let Ω = {ωi}∞i=1 be a countable state space. Let Wi be the
indicator function for state ωi :Wi(ω) = 1 if ω = ωi and Wi(ω) = 0 if ω 6= ωi.
Consider a collection of merely finitely additive coherent1 forecasts P (Wi) =
pi ≥ 0 where
∑∞
i=1 pi = c < 1. So P (·) is not countably additive. With αi = 1,
for all i, the loss from combining these infinitely many forecasts into a single
option is uniformly positive,
∞∑
i=1
αi[Wi(ω)− pi] = (1− c)> 0.
Hence, the decision maker’s alternative to abstain, with constant loss 0,
uniformly strictly dominates this infinite combination of fair options.
If, on the other hand, the decision maker’s personal probability P is count-
ably additive, then c= 1. For arbitrary {αi}∞i=1 such that d=
∑∞
i=1αipi is
defined and finite, the sum of losses is
∞∑
i=1
αi[Wi(ω)− pi] = αi(ω) − d,(7)
where i(ω) is the unique i such that Wi(ω) = 1. Because c = 1, there is at
least one αi ≤ d and at least one αi ≥ d, hence (7) must be nonpositive for
at least one i, and abstaining does not uniformly strictly dominate.
Next, we focus on the parallel question whether a coherent3 set of fore-
casts remains undominated when strictly proper scores for countably many
forecasts are summed together. Some conditions will be needed in order to
avoid ∞−∞ arising in the calculations, and these are stated precisely in
the theorems. The principal difference between dominance for infinite sums
of forecasts and dominance for infinite sums of strictly proper scores is ex-
pressed by the following result.
Theorem 1. Let C be a collection of strictly proper scoring rules of the
form (1) that satisfies the uniform spread condition. Let P be a coherent3
prevision defined over a collection D of random variables that contains all
of the random variables mentioned in the statement of this theorem. Let
{Xi}∞i=1 be random variables in D with coherent3 forecasts P (Xi) = pi for
i= 1,2, . . . . Assume that the forecast for Xi will be scored by a scoring rule
gi ∈ C for each i. Finally, assume that
P
[
∞∑
i=1
|Xi − pi|
]
= V <∞ and(8)
P
[
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi, pi)
]
=W <∞.(9)
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There does not exist a rival set of forecasts {qi}∞i=1 such that, for all ω ∈Ω,
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), pi)>
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), qi).(10)
Theorem 1 asserts conditions under which infinite sums of strictly proper
scores, with coherent3 forecasts {pi}∞i=1 for {Xi}∞i=1, have no rival forecasts
that simply dominate, let alone uniformly strictly dominate {pi}∞i=1. That
is, even countably many unconditional coherent3 forecasts cannot be simply
dominated under the conditions of Theorem 1.
Example 3 (Example 2 continued). Recall that Ω= {ωi : i= 1, . . .} is a
countable space. Consider the special case in which P is a purely finitely ad-
ditive probability satisfying P ({ωi}) = pi = 0, for all i. So,
∑∞
i=1 pi = 0< 1,
and c= 0 in the notation of Example 2. As before, let Wi (i= 1, . . .) be the
indicator functions for the states in Ω. So P (Wi) = pi = 0 and combining the
losses Wi− pi =Wi, for i= 1, . . . results in a uniform sure-loss of 1. But this
example, with each gi equal to Brier score times αi > 0, satisfies the condi-
tions of Theorem 1, if the αi are bounded above. That is, there are no rival
forecasts {qi}∞i=1 for the {Wi}∞i=1 that simply dominate the forecasts {pi}∞i=1
by weighted sum of Brier scores, let alone uniformly strictly dominating
these forecasts. We can illustrate the conclusion of Theorem 1 directly in
this example. The weighted sum of Brier scores for the pi forecasts is
S(ω) =
∞∑
i=1
αiWi(ω)
2 ≤ sup
i
αi.
Let {qi}∞i=1 be a rival set of forecasts with qi 6= pi for at least one i. The
corresponding weighted sum of Brier scores is
∞∑
i=1
αi[Wi(ω)− qi]2 = S(ω)− 2
∞∑
i=1
αiqiWi(ω) +
∞∑
i=1
αiq
2
i .(11)
Let d=
∑∞
i=1αiq
2
i , which must be strictly greater than 0. Define i(ω) to be
the unique value of i such that Wi(ω) = 1. The right-hand side of (11) can
then be written as S(ω)− 2αi(ω)qi(ω) + d. If d=∞, then the rival forecasts
clearly fail to dominate the original forecasts. If d <∞, then limi→∞√αiqi =
0. Because the αi themselves are bounded, it follows that all but finitely
many αi|qi| are less than d/2. For each ω such that αi(ω)|qi(ω)| < d/2, we
have the weighted sum of Brier scores displayed in (11) strictly greater than
S(ω), hence the rival forecasts do not dominate the original forecasts.
Theorem 1, as illustrated by Example 3, shows that the modified deci-
sion problem in de Finetti’s prevision game—modified to include infinite
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sums of betting outcomes—is not isomorphic to the modified forecasting
problem under strictly proper scoring rules—modified to include infinite
sums of scores. In particular, abstaining from betting, which is the alter-
native that uniformly dominates the losses for coherence1, is not an avail-
able alternative under forecasting with strictly proper scores. In summary,
the two criteria, coherence1 and coherence3 behave differently when prob-
ability is merely finitely additive and we try to combine countably many
forecasts.
We conclude this section with an example to show why we assume that
the class of scoring rules satisfies the uniform spread condition in Theorem 1.
Example 4. This example satisfies all of the conditions of Theorem 1
except that the class of scoring rules fails the uniform spread condition. We
show that the conclusion to Theorem 1 also fails. For each integer i≥ 1, let
αi = 2
−i−1, and define
fi(v) =
{2, if v ≤ αi,
2
αi
, if v > αi.
Let λi be the measure whose Radon–Nikodym derivative with respect to
Lebesgue measure is fi, and define gi by (1) using λ= λi. The form of gi is
as follows:
gi(x, q) =


(x− q)2, if x, q ≤ αi,
(x− αi)2 + 1
αi
(q −αi)2 + 2
αi
(q −αi)(αi − x), if x≤ αi ≤ q,
1
αi
(x−αi)2 + (q −αi)2 + 2(αi − q)(x−αi), if q ≤ αi ≤ x,
1
αi
(x− q)2, if αi ≤ x, q.
These scoring rules fail the uniform spread condition because arbitrarily
short intervals with both endpoints positive have arbitrarily large λi measure
as i increases. Let {Ai}∞i=1 be a partition of the real line, and let P (·) be a
finitely additive probability such that P (Ai) = 0 for all i. For each integer
i≥ 1, let pi = 2−i and qi = 2−i−1, and define
Xi(ω) =
{
pi, if ω ∈ACi ,
qi− 1, if ω ∈Ai.
It follows that P (Xi) = pi for all i, and
P
[
∞∑
i=1
|Xi − pi|
]
= P
[
∞∑
i=1
Ai|qi − 1− pi|
]
= 1,
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so that (8) holds. Next, compute the various scores:
gi(Xi(ω), pi)
=Ai(ω)
{
(qi− 1−αi)2 + 1
αi
(pi −αi)2 + 2
αi
(pi −αi)(αi − qi +1)
}
=Ai(ω)[3 + 2
−i−1],
gi(Xi(ω), qi)
=ACi (ω)
1
αi
(pi − qi)2 +Ai(ω)(qi − 1− qi)2
=ACi (ω)2
−i−1 +Ai(ω).
Define i(ω) = i for that unique i such that ω ∈ Ai. When we sum up the
scores for the forecasts {pi}∞i=1, we get
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), pi) =
∞∑
i=1
Ai(ω)[3 + 2
−i−1] = 3+ 2−i(ω)−1.
It follows that P (
∑∞
i=1 gi(Xi, pi)) = 3, so (9) holds. The sum of the {qi}∞i=1
scores is
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), qi) =
∞∑
i=1
[ACi (ω)2
−i−1 +Ai(ω)] = 1.5− 2−i(ω)−1.
Finally, compute the difference in total scores:
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), pi)−
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), qi) = 1.5 + 2
−i(ω) > 1.5,
hence the scores of the {pi}∞i=1 forecasts are uniformly strictly dominated
by the scores of a set of rival forecasts.
4.2. Dominance for countable sums of conditional forecasts. Definition 2
allows mixing conditional forecasts with unconditional forecasts by setting
P (X|H) = P (X) wheneverH =Ω. De Finetti showed that, if P (X), P (X|H)
and P (HX) are all specified, a necessary condition for coherence1 is that
P (HX) = P (H)P (X|H),(12)
so that P (X|H) is the usual conditional expected value of X given H when-
ever P (H)> 0. For this reason, conditional forecasts are often called condi-
tional expectations.
The concept of conglomerability plays a central role in our results about
coherence for combining countably many conditional forecasts. Conglomer-
ability in a partition π = {Hj : j ∈ J} of conditional expectations P (·|Hj)
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over a class D of random variables X is the requirement that the uncon-
ditional expectation of each X ∈ D lies within the range of its conditional
expectations given elements of π.
Definition 7. Let P be a finitely additive prevision on a set D of
random variables, and let π = {Hj : j ∈ J} be a partition of Ω such that
conditional prevision P (·|Hj) has been defined for all j. If, for each X ∈D,
inf
j∈J
P (X|Hj)≤ P (X)≤ sup
j∈J
P (X|Hj),
then P is conglomerable in the partition π with respect to D. Otherwise, P
is nonconglomerable in π with respect to D.
If a decision maker’s coherent1 or coherent3 forecasts fail conglomerabil-
ity in a partition π, Theorem 2 below shows there exist countably many
conditional forecasts that are uniformly strictly dominated.
On the other hand, if the decision maker’s previsions for random variables
satisfy a condition (see Definition 8) similar to being conglomerable in π,
Theorem 3 below establishes that no countable set of forecasts, conditional
on elements of π, can be uniformly strictly dominated. What we mean by
“similar” is explained in Section 4.3 below.
Theorem 2. Let P be a finitely additive prevision, and let D be a set
of random variables. Let π = {Hj}∞j=1 be a denumerable partition and let
P (·|Hj) be the corresponding conditional previsions associated with P . Let C
be a collection of strictly proper scoring rules of the form (1) that satisfies the
uniform similarity condition. Assume that the conditional previsions P (·|Hj)
are nonconglomerable in π with respect to D. Then there exists a random
variable X ∈D with pX = P (X) and pj = P (X|Hj) for all j such that
(2.1) the countable sum
α0(X − pX) +
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X − pj),
of individually fair options is uniformly strictly dominated by abstaining,
and
(2.2) if the forecast for X is scored by g0 ∈ C and the conditional forecast
for X given Hj is scored by gj ∈ C for j = 1,2, . . . , then the sum of the scores,
g0(X(ω), pX) +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)gj(X(ω), pj),
is uniformly strictly dominated by the sum of scores from a rival set of
forecasts.
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We illustrate Theorem 2 with an example of nonconglomerability due to
Dubins (1975). This example is illuminating as the conditional probabilities
do not involve conditioning on null events.
Example 5. Let Ω = {ωij : i = 1,2; j = 1, . . .}. Let F = {ω2j , j = 1, . . .}
and let Hj = {ω1j, ω2j}. Define a merely finitely additive probability P so
that P ({ω1j}) = 0, P ({ω2j}) = 2−(j+1) for j = 1, . . . , and let P (F ) = pF =
1/2. Note that P (Hj) = 2
−(j+1) > 0, so P (F |Hj) = 1 = pj is well defined by
the multiplication rule for conditional probability. Evidently, the conditional
probabilities {P (F |Hj)}∞j=1 are nonconglomerable in π since P (F ) = 1/2
whereas P (F |Hj) = 1 for all j.
For (2.1), Consider the fair options αjHj(F −pj) for j = 1, . . . and αF (F −
pF ). Choose αj = 1 and αF =−1. Then[
−(F (ω)− pF ) +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)[F (ω)− pj]
]
=
{
0.5− 1.0 =−0.5, if ω /∈ F ,
−0.5 + 0.0 =−0.5, if ω ∈ F .
Hence, these infinitely many individually fair options are not collectively
fair when taken together. Their sum is uniformly strictly dominated by 0 in
Ω, corresponding to the option to abstain from betting.
Regarding (2.2), unlike the situation with Theorem 1 involving countably
many unconditional forecasts, the sum of Brier scores from these conditional
forecasts are uniformly strictly dominated. In particular, the sum of Brier
scores for these forecasts is
(F (ω)− pF )2 +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)[F (ω)− pj]2
=
{
0.25 + 1.00 = 1.25, if ω /∈ F ,
0.25 + 0.00 = 0.25, if ω ∈ F .
Consider the rival forecasts Q(F |Hj) = 0.75 = qj and Q(F ) = 0.75 = qF .
These correspond to the countably additive probability Q({ω1j}) = 0.25×
2−j and Q({ω2j}) = 0.75× 2−j for j = 1, . . . . Then the combined Brier score
from these countably many rival forecasts is
(F (ω)− qF )2 +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)[F (ω)− qj]2
=
{
9/16 + 9/16 = 1.125, if ω /∈ F ,
1/16 + 1/16 = 0.125, if ω ∈ F ,
which is 0.125 less than the sum of the Brier scores of the original forecasts.
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We offer one more example to show why we assume that the class of
scoring rules satisfies the uniform similarity condition in Theorem 2.
Example 6 (Example 5 continued). Recall that we have a partition
π = {Hj}∞j=1 and an event F with pF = P (F ) = 0.5 and pj = P (F |Hj) = 1
for all j. Let the unconditional forecast for F be scored by Brier score, and
let the conditional forecast for F given Hj be scored by 2
−j−1 times Brier
score. These scoring rules fail the uniform similarity condition. We show
that the conclusion to Theorem 2 fails. Specifically, we show that there is
no rival set of forecasts qF for F and qj for Hj (j = 1,2, . . .) whose sum of
scores uniformly strictly dominates the original forecasts.
The total of the scores for the original forecasts is
1
4
+
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)2
−j−1[1− F (ω)]2.(13)
Consider an arbitrary rival set of forecasts with qF for F and qj for F
conditional on Hj . The sum of the scores for the rival forecasts is
[qF −F (ω)]2 +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)2
−j−1[qj −F (ω)]2.(14)
Let i(ω) = j when ω ∈Hj . Then the difference (13) minus (14) is
1
4 − [qF − F (ω)]2 +2−i(ω)−1([1−F (ω)]2 − [qj − F (ω)]2).(15)
If qF = 0.5, then (15) becomes
2−i(ω)(1− qi(ω))
[
1 + qi(ω)
2
− F (ω)
]
.(16)
If there exists ω such that qi(ω) ≥ 1, (16) is nonpositive, and the rival fore-
casts do not strictly dominate. If all qi(ω) < 1, (16) is negative for all ω ∈ F ,
and there is no dominance. If qF 6= 0.5, then (15) is at most
1
4 − [qF −F (ω)]2 +2−i(ω).(17)
No matter what qF 6= 0.5 we pick, either (qF − 1)2 or (qF − 0)2 is greater
than 1/4. Let δ = 1/4−max{[qF −1]2, q2F}. For j >− log2(δ), (17) is negative
either for all ω ∈ F ∩Hj or all ω ∈ FC ∩Hj . So, there is no dominance.
Last, we establish conditions under which combining strictly proper scores
from countably many conditional forecasts given elements of a partition,
or combining the losses from countably many fair options based on those
forecasts, does not result in a uniform sure loss. A definition is useful first.
Definition 8. Let P be a finitely additive prevision on a set D of
random variables, and let π = {Hj : j ∈ J} be a partition of Ω such that
16 M. J. SCHERVISH, T. SEIDENFELD AND J. B. KADANE
conditional prevision P (·|Hj) has been defined for all j. For each random
variable X ∈ D, we let P (X|π) denote the random variable Y defined by
Y (ω) = P (X|Hj) for all ω ∈Hj and all j. We say that P satisfies the law
of total previsions in π with respect to D provided that for each random
variable X ∈D, P (X) = P [P (X|π)].
Theorem 3. Let P be a finitely additive prevision, and let D be a set
of random variables such that P satisfies the law of total previsions in π =
{Hj}∞j=1 with respect to D. Let X ∈ D be a random variable with finite
prevision pX = P (X) and finite conditional prevision pj = P (X|Hj) given
each Hj . Assume that P (·|Hj) is a finitely additive expectation (in the sense
of Definition 10) that satisfies P (X|Hj) = P (HjX|Hj) for every j. Let C be
a collection of strictly proper scoring rules.
(3.1) Let {αj}∞j=0 be real numbers. The sum of losses
α0(X(ω)− pX) +
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(ω)[X(ω)− pj],(18)
is not uniformly strictly dominated by abstaining.
(3.2) Let g0, g1, . . . be elements of C. There is no rival set of forecasts that
uniformly strictly dominates the sum of scores
g0(X(ω), pX) +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)gj(X(ω), pj).(19)
4.3. Conglomerability, disintegrability and the law of total previsions. We
claimed earlier that the law of total previsions in a partition π is similar to
conglomerability in π. The claim begins with a result of Dubins (1975). Du-
bins defines conglomerability in partition π of a finitely additive prevision P
by the requirement that, for all bounded random variables X ,
if ∀H ∈ πP (X|H)≥ 0, then P (X)≥ 0.
Dubins’ definition of conglomerability in π is equivalent to Definition 7 with
respect to the set of all bounded random variables. However, for a set D that
includes unbounded random variables and/or does not include all bounded
random variables, the two definitions are not equivalent without further
assumptions. Definition 7 is based on the definition given by de Finetti
[(1974), Section 4.7], which generalizes to unbounded random variables more
easily.
Dubins (1975) also defines disintegrability of P in partition π by the re-
quirement that, for every bounded random variable X ,
P (X) =
∫
P (X|h)dP (h),
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where the finitely additive integral is as developed by Dunford and Schwartz
[(1958), Chapter III]. Moreover, he establishes that conglomerability and
disintegrability in π are equivalent for the class of bounded random vari-
ables.
The law of total previsions in Definition 8, with respect to the set of all
bounded random variables, is equivalent to disintegrability in Dubins’ sense,
but not necessarily for sets that either include some unbounded random vari-
ables or fail to include some bounded random variables. In addition, not all
real-valued coherent1 previsions admit an integral representation in the sense
of Dunford and Schwartz for sets that include unbounded random variables.
For discussion of the problem and related issues, see Berti, Regazzini and
Rigo (2001); Berti and Rigo (1992, 2000, 2002); Schervish, Seidenfeld, and
Kadane (2008b) and Seidenfeld, Schervish and Kadane (2009). As described
in Appendix A, we use a definition of finitely additive integral that is a nat-
ural extension of coherent1 prevision. In this way, the law of total previsions
extends Dubins’ definition of disintegrability from bounded to unbounded
random variables without introducing the technical details of Dunford and
Schwartz. Finally, Theorem 1 of Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (2008b)
gives conditions under which conglomerability (Definition 7) is equivalent to
the law of total previsions. The following is a translation of that result into
the notation and terminology of the present paper.
Theorem 4. Let P be a finitely additive prevision on a set D of random
variables. Let π = {Hj}∞j=1 be a denumerable partition and let P (·|Hj) be the
corresponding conditional previsions associated with P . Assume that, for all
j, P (·|Hj) is a finitely additive expectation on D. Also assume that, for all
X ∈D:
• P (X) is finite,
• P (X|Hj) is finite for all j,
• HjX ∈D for all j,
• P (HjX|Hj) = P (X|Hj) for all j, and
• X − Y ∈D, where Y is defined (in terms of X) in Definition 8.
Then P is conglomerable in π with respect to D if and only if P satisfies the
law of total previsions in π with respect to D.
Under the conditions of Theorem 4, Theorems 2 and 3 show that, when the
conditioning events form a countable partition π, coherence1 and coherence3
behave the same when extended to include, respectively, the countable sum
of individually fair options, and the total of strictly proper scores from the
forecasts. If and only if these coherent quantities are based on conditional
expectations that are conglomerable in π, then no failures of the Dominance
Principle result by combining infinitely many of them.
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Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (1984) show that each merely finitely
additive probability fails to be conglomerable in some countable partition.
But each countably additive probability has expectations that are conglom-
erable in each countable partition. Thus, the conjunction of Theorems 1,
2 and 3 identifies where the debate whether personal probability may be
merely finitely additive runs up against the debate whether to extend ei-
ther coherence criterion in order to apply it with countable combinations of
quantities. We arrive at the following conclusions:
• Unless unconditional coherent1 forecasts arise from a countably additive
probability, combining countably many unconditional coherent1 forecasts
into a single option may be dominated by abstaining.
• However, under the conditions of Theorem 1, strictly proper scoring rules
are not similarly affected. The scores from countably many coherent3 un-
conditional forecasts may be summed together without leading to a vio-
lation of the Dominance Principle.
• Unless conditional forecasts arise from a set of conglomerable conditional
probabilities, the Dominance Principle does not allow combining count-
ably many of these quantities into a single option. Hence, only countably
additive conditional probabilities satisfy the Dominance Principle when
an arbitrary countable set of conditional quantities are summed together.
5. Incentive compatible elicitation of infinitely many forecasts using strict-
ly proper scoring rules. Scoring an agent based on the values of the fair
gambles constructed from coherent1 forecasts, is not proper. Because of the
presence of the opponent in the game, who gets to choose whether to buy
or to sell the random variable X at the decision maker’s announced price,
the decision maker faces a strategic choice of pricing. For example, if the de-
cision maker suspects that the opponent’s fair price, Q(X), is greater than
his own, P (X), then it pays to inflate the announced price and to offer
the opponent, for example, R(X) = [P (X) +Q(X)]/2, rather than offering
P (X). Thus, the forecast-game as de Finetti defined it for coherence1 is not
incentive compatible for eliciting the decision maker’s fair prices.
With a finite set of forecasts and a strictly proper scoring rule for each
one, using the finite sum of the scores as the score for the finite set preserves
strict propriety. That is, with the sum of strictly proper scores as the score
for the finite set, a coherent forecaster minimizes the expected sum of scores
by minimizing each one, and this solution is unique.
Here, we report what happens to the propriety of strictly proper scores
in each of the three settings of the three theorems presented in Section 4.
That is, we answer the question whether or not, in each of these three
settings, the coherent forecaster minimizes expected score for the infinite
sum of strictly proper scores by announcing her/his coherent forecast for
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each of the infinitely many variables. These findings are corollaries to the
respective theorems.
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, the infinite sum
of scores applied to the infinite set of forecasts {pi}∞i=1 is a strictly proper
scoring rule.
Corollary 2. Under the assumptions used for (2.2) of Theorem 2,
namely when the conditional probabilities P (F |Hj) = pj are nonconglomer-
able in π, then the infinite sum of strictly proper scores applied to the infinite
set of conditional forecasts {pj}∞j=1 is not proper.
Corollary 3. Under the assumptions used to establish (3.2) of Theo-
rem 3, namely that P satisfies the law of total previsions in π, the infinite
sum of strictly proper scores applied to the infinite set of conditional forecasts
{pj}∞j=1 is a proper scoring rule.
Thus, these results about the propriety of infinite sums of strictly proper
scores parallel the respective results about extending coherence3 to allow
infinite sums of scores.
6. Summary. We study how two different coherence criteria behave with
respect to a Dominance Principle when countable collections of random vari-
ables are included. Theorem 1 shows that, in contrast with fair prices for
coherence1, when strictly proper scores from infinitely many unconditional
forecasts are summed together there are no new failures of the Dominance
Principle for coherence3. That is, if an infinite set of probabilistic forecasts
{pi}∞i=1 are even simply dominated by some rival forecast scheme {qi}∞i=1 in
total score, then the {pi}∞i=1 are not coherent3, that is, some finite subset
of them is uniformly strictly dominated in total score. However, because
each merely finitely additive probability fails to be conglomerable in some
denumerable partition, in the light of Theorem 2, neither of the two coher-
ence criteria discussed here may be relaxed in order to apply the Dominance
Principle with infinite combinations of conditional options. Merely finitely
additive probabilities then would become incoherent.
Specifically, the conjunction of Theorems 1–4 shows that it matters only
in cases that involve nonconglomerability whether incoherence3 is estab-
lished using scores from a finite rather than from an infinite combination
of forecasts. In that one respect, we think coherence3 constitutes an im-
proved version of the concept of coherence. Coherence1 applied to a merely
finitely additive probability leads to failures of the Dominance Principle both
with infinite combinations of unconditional and infinite combinations of non-
conglomerable conditional probabilities. Coherence3 leads to failures of the
Dominance Principle only with infinite combinations of nonconglomerable
conditional probabilities.
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A referee suggested that de Finetti might have been working with a dif-
ferent Dominance Principle, here denoted Dominance*.
Dominance* : Let Oi and Oj be two options in O. If Oi uniformly (strictly)
dominances Oj and there exists an option Ok in O that is not itself dominated
by some Ot in O, then Oj is an inadmissible choice from O.
Dominance* requires that some option from O is undominated if dominance
signals inadmissibility. With respect to the decision problems considered in
this paper, each of our results formulated with respect to the Dominance
Principle obtains also with Dominance*. Because Dominance* implies Dom-
inance as we have defined it, the only result that needs to be checked is
Theorem 2. In that case, so long as O contains options that correspond to
a probability that satisfies the law of total previsions in π (as will all count-
ably additive probabilities) then Theorem 3 says that such options will be
undominated. So, we could replace Dominance by Dominance* in the results
of this paper.
APPENDIX A: FINITELY ADDITIVE EXPECTATIONS
This appendix gives the definitions of infinite prevision and finitely addi-
tive expectation along with brief motivation for these definitions. Details are
given in the supplemental article [Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (2014)].
A.1. Infinite previsions. Our theorems assume that various random vari-
ables have finite previsions. In the proof of Theorem 1, the possibility arises
that some other random variable has infinite prevision. Definition 2 makes
no sense if infinite previsions are possible. Fortunately, we can extend the
concept of coherent1 (conditional) prevision to handle infinite values, which
correspond to expressing a willingness either to buy or to sell a gamble, but
not both.
Definition 9. Let {P (Xi|Bi) : i ∈ I} be a collection of conditional pre-
visions. The previsions are coherent1 if, for every finite n, every {i1, . . . , in} ⊆
I , all real α1, . . . , αn such that αj ≤ 0 for all j with P (Xij |Bij ) =∞ and
αj ≥ 0 for all j with P (Xij |Bij ) = −∞, and all real c1, . . . , cn such that
cj = P (Xij |Bij ) for each j such that P (Xij |Bij ) is finite, we have
inf
ω∈Ω
n∑
j=1
αjBij(ω)[Xij (ω)− cj]≤ 0.(20)
That is, no linear combination of gambles may be uniformly strictly domi-
nated by the alternative option of abstaining.
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Notice the restrictions on the signs of coefficients in Definition 9, namely
that for each infinite prevision, αj has the opposite sign as the prevision.
These restrictions express the meaning of infinite previsions as being one-
sided in the sense that they merely specify that all real numbers are either
acceptable buy prices (for ∞ previsions) or acceptable sell prices (for −∞
previsions) but not fair prices for both transactions. Crisma, Gigante and
Millossovich (1997) and Crisma and Gigante (2001) give alternate defini-
tions of coherence for infinite previsions and conditional previsions. But
their definition does not make clear the connection to gambling. However,
the definition of Crisma, Gigante and Millossovich (1997) and Definition 9
are equivalent for unconditional previsions, as shown in the supplemental
article [Schervish, Seidenfeld and Kadane (2014)].
A.2. Prevision and expectation. Throughout this paper, an expectation
with respect to a finitely additive probability will be defined as a special type
of linear functional on a space of random variables. [See Heath and Sudderth
(1978) for the case of bounded random variables.] Infinite previsions are
allowed in the sense of Section A.1.
Definition 10. Let L be a linear space of real-valued functions defined
on Ω that contains all constant functions, and let L be an extended-real-
valued functional defined on L. If (X,Y ∈ L and X ≤ Y ) implies L(X) ≤
L(Y ), we say that L is nonnegative. We call L an extended-linear functional
on L, if, for all real α,β and all X,Y ∈ L,
L(αX + βY ) = αL(X) + βL(Y ),(21)
whenever the arithmetic on the right-hand side of (21) is well defined (i.e.,
not ∞−∞) and where 0×±∞= 0 in (21). A nonnegative extended-linear
functional is called a finitely additive Daniell integral. [See Schervish, Sei-
denfeld and Kadane (2008a).] If L(1) = 1, we say that L is normalized.
A normalized finitely additive Daniell integral is called a finitely additive
expectation.
Note that, if ∞−∞ appears on the right-hand side of (21), L(αX +βY )
still has a value, but the value cannot be determined from (21). Finitely
additive expectations are essentially equivalent to coherent1 previsions, as
we prove in the supplemental article. Finitely additive expectations also
behave like integrals in many ways, as we explain in more detail in the
supplemental article. In particular, when the finitely additive expectation
defined here is restricted to bounded functions, it is the same as the definition
of integral developed by Dunford and Schwartz (1958), and it is the same
as the integral used by Dubins (1975) in his results about disintegrability.
Hence, Definition 10 is an extension of the definition of integral from sets of
bounded functions to arbitrary linear spaces of functions.
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APPENDIX B: PROOFS OF RESULTS
B.1. Proof of Lemma 1. Let g be of the form (1). Let P be such that
p= P (X) is finite, and let q0 be such that P [g(X,q0)] is finite. If q 6= p, then
P [g(X,q)− g(X,p)] = λ((q, p))[p− r(q, p, λ)],(22)
according to (5). Because Lebesgue measure is absolutely continuous with
respect to λ, neither λ((q, p)) nor p− r(q, p, λ) equals 0 and they have the
same sign. It follows that (22) is strictly positive. Since p is finite, (22) is
finite with q = q0, so that P [g(X,p)] is also finite and so q = p provides the
unique minimum value of P [g(X,q)].
B.2. Proof of Lemma 2. Since r(b, a,λ) = r(a, b, λ), it suffices to assume
that a < b. Let ε > 0.
(i) If λi((a, b))≥ ε and b0 < b is such that λi((a, b0)) = ε, then the probabil-
ity obtained by normalizing λi on the interval (a, b) stochastically dominates
the probability obtained by normalizing λi on the interval (a, b0). Hence,
r(a.b, λi)≥ r(a, b0, λi). So, it suffices to find a δ that implies r(a, b, λi)−a≥ δ
for all i ∈ I and all a < b such that λi((a, b)) = ε. For the remainder of the
proof, let a < b with λi((a, b)) = ε, and let Q be the probability obtained
by normalizing λi on (a, b). Let λ0 be U times Lebesgue measure. Then
λ0((a, a+ ε/U)) = ε, and r(a, a+ ε/U,λ0) = a+ ε/(2U). Because fi ≤ U , it
follows that Q stochastically dominates the probability obtained by normal-
izing λ0 on (a, a+ ε/U), hence r(a, b, λi)≥ a+ ε/(2U), and r(a, b, λi)− a≥
ε/(2U). The proof b− r(a, b, λi)≥ ε/(2U) is similar, so δε can be taken equal
to ε/(2U).
(ii) Let i ∈ I , and assume that λi((a, b))≥ ε. Since fj(v)>Lifi(v) for all
v, we have λj((a, b))≥ Liε, so γi,ε can be taken to be Liε.
B.3. Proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Because a larger random
variable has a larger prevision than a smaller random variable, a necessary
condition for (10) is that
Z = P
[
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi, qi)
]
≤ P
[
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi, pi)
]
<∞.(23)
Hence, we will assume that Z <∞ from now on. Also, it is necessary for
(10) that qi 6= pi for at least one i, so we will assume this also.
In light of (5), we can write, for each finite k > 0,
∞>Z −W = P
[
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi, qi)−
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi, pi)
]
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=
k∑
i=1
λi((qi, pi))[pi − ri] +P
[
∞∑
i=k+1
gi(Xi, qi)−
∞∑
i=k+1
gi(Xi, pi)
]
≥
k∑
i=1
λi((qi, pi))[pi − ri]−W,
where the inequality follows because gi is nonnegative for each i and where
ri = r(qi, pi, λi) from (4). Since Z −W does not depend on k, it follows that∑∞
i=1 λi((qi, pi))[pi − ri] is finite.
Because of (9) and (23), the two series
∑∞
i=1 gi(Xi(ω), qi) and∑∞
i=1 gi(Xi(ω), pi) are simultaneously finite with probability 1. Let B be
the event that at least one of the two series is finite. On BC , both series
sum to∞, hence (10) fails unless BC =∅. Hence, we can assume that B =Ω
for the rest of the proof. It now follows that, for all ω,
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), qi)−
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi(ω), pi)
(24)
=
∞∑
i=1
[gi(Xi(ω), qi)− gi(Xi(ω), pi)].
We complete the proof by showing that
P
[
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi, qi)−
∞∑
i=1
gi(Xi, pi)
]
> 0.(25)
Because a nonpositive random variable has nonpositive forecast, (25) implies
that (10) cannot hold for all ω. In light of (24), it suffices to show that
P
(
∞∑
i=1
[gi(Xi, qi)− gi(Xi, pi)]
)
> 0.(26)
For each k,
P
(
k∑
i=1
[gi(Xi, qi)− gi(Xi, pi)]
)
=
k∑
i=1
λi((qi, pi))(pi − ri)≥ 0.(27)
Next, in light of (5) and (27), write
P
(
∞∑
i=1
[gi(Xi, qi)− gi(Xi, pi)]
)
(28)
=
k∑
i=1
λi((qi, pi))(pi − ri) +P
[
∞∑
i=k+1
λi((qi, pi))(Xi − ri)
]
.
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Since the left-hand side of (28) does not depend on k and the first sum
on the right side is nondecreasing in k, it follows that the second sum on
the right-hand side is nonincreasing in k, and hence, has a limit. Let T =∑∞
i=1 λi((qi, pi))(pi− ri), which is finite and strictly positive (because qi 6= pi
for at least one i). Then, the right-hand side of (28) becomes
T + lim
k→∞
P
[
∞∑
i=k+1
λi((qi, pi))(Xi − pi)
]
.(29)
The proof will be complete if we can show that the limit in (29) is 0.
First, we show that limi→∞ λi((qi, pi)) = 0. If lim supi→∞ |λi((qi, pi))| =
ℓ > 0, then there must exist a subsequence {ij}∞j=1 with |λij ((qij , pij ))| >
ℓ/2 for all j. For such a subsequence, the uniform spread condition implies
that there is δℓ/2 > 0 such that |pij − rij | ≥ δℓ/2. This would make T =∞,
a contradiction.
It now follows that∣∣∣∣∣P
[
∞∑
i=k+1
λi((qi, pi))(Xi − pi)
]∣∣∣∣∣≤ maxi≥k+1|λi((qi, pi))|P
(
∞∑
i=1
|Xi − pi|
)
= V max
i≥k+1
|λi((qi, pi))|,
which can be made arbitrarily small by increasing k, and (26) follows.
Corollary 1 is equivalent to equation (25), which is established in the proof
of Theorem 1.
B.4. Proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2. Let π = {Hj}∞j=1 be a de-
numerable partition. Nononglomerability means that there exists a random
variable X such that either
inf
j
P (X|Hj)−P (X)> 0 or
sup
j
P (X|Hj)−P (X)< 0.
Clearly, if X satisfies one of the above inequalities, −X satisfies the other,
hence we will assume that the first inequality holds. Specifically, let pX =
P (X) and pj = P (X|Hj) for all j, and assume that
ε= inf
j
pj − pX > 0.
Also, for each ω ∈ Ω, let i(ω) be the unique integer such that ω ∈ Hi(ω).
Hence Hj(ω) = 1 if and only if j = i(ω).
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(2.1) Consider the following sum of individually fair options: X(ω)− pX
and the countably many options −Hj(ω)[X(ω)− pj] for j = 1,2, . . . . Then,
for each ω,
X(ω)− pX +
∞∑
j=1
−Hj(ω)[X(ω)− pj]
=X(ω)− pX −X(ω) + pi(ω) =−pX + pi(ω) ≥ ε.
Thus, the countable sum of the conditional forecasts for X given Hj , com-
bined with the forecast for X results in a loss that is uniformly strictly
dominated by 0.
(2.2) For an arbitrary set of forecasts sX for X and sj for X given Hj
(for j = 1, . . .), the sum of the scores in state ω equals
g0(X(ω), sX) +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)gj(X(ω), sj)
= g0(X(ω), sX) + gi(ω)(X(ω), si(ω))(30)
=
∫ X(ω)
sX
[X(ω)− v]dλ0(v) +
∫ X(ω)
si(ω)
[X(ω)− v]dλi(ω)(v).
We can substitute the original forecasts sX = pX and sj = pj , j = 1, . . .
into (30) to obtain the total score for each ω ∈ Ω. We can also identify
dominating rival forecasts qX and qj , j = 1, . . . , so that (30) is uniformly
larger, for each state ω ∈ Ω with sX = pX and sj = pj than with sX = qX
and sj = qj .
Let w0 = λ0((pX , pX + ε))/2, and let w1 = γw0 , where γw0 is from part
(ii) of Lemma 2. Let q′ be such that λ0((q
′, pX + ε)) = w0. This makes
λj((q
′, pX + ε))≥w1 for all j. For each j, pj ≥ pX + ε, so that λj((q′, pj))≥
w1. Let w2 = 0.9min{w0,w1}, and let qj be such that λj((qj , pj)) = w2 for
all j. This makes qj > q
′ for all j. Let qX be such that λ0((pX , qX)) = w2.
This makes qX < q
′.
We now form the difference between the scores for the original forecasts
and the rival forecasts. Subtracting (30) with s= qX and sj = qj (for all j)
from (30) with s= pX and sj = pj (for all j) yields∫ qX
pX
[X(ω)− v]dλ0(v)−
∫ pi(ω)
qi(ω)
[X(ω)− v]dλi(ω)(v).(31)
We need to find a positive number δ such that (31) is strictly greater than
δ for all ω. The difference in (31) is greater than
[X(ω)− qX ]λ0((pX , qX))− [X(ω)− qi(ω)]λi(ω)((qi(ω), pi(ω)))
=w2(qi(ω) − qX)>w2(q′ − qX)> 0.
So, we set δ =w2(q
′ − qX)> 0, which completes the proof.
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Corollary 2 is immediate from (2.2) of Theorem 2, as the existence of
the rival set of dominating forecasts, {qj}∞j=1, establishes that the forecaster
does not minimize the infinite sum of expected scores by giving the forecast
pX and the conditional forecasts {pj}∞j=1.
B.5. Proofs of Theorem 3 and Corollary 3. (3.1) In order to show that
(18) cannot be uniformly strictly positive, it is sufficient to show
P
[
α0(X − pX) +
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X − pj)
]
= 0.(32)
Of course,
P
[
α0(X−pX)+
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X−pj)
]
= P [α0(X−pX)]+P
[
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X−pj)
]
.
Trivially,
P [α0(X − pX)] = 0.(33)
Since P satisfies the law of total previsions in π,
P
[
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X − pj)
]
= P
[
P
[
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X − pi)
∣∣∣π
]]
.
For each i,
∑
j 6=iαjHj(ω)[X(ω)− pj ] = 0 for all ω ∈Hi. It follows that, for
every i,
P
[
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X − pj)
∣∣∣Hi
]
= P [αiHi(X − pi)|Hi],
and trivially, P [αiHi(X − pi)|Hi] = 0.
Thus,
P
[
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X − pi)
∣∣∣π
]
= 0
for all ω, and it follows by the law of total previsions that
P
[
∞∑
j=1
αjHj(X − pj)
]
= 0.(34)
Equations (33) and (34) establish (32).
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(3.2) We must establish that there is no rival set of forecasts qX , and
{qj}∞j=1 whose total score uniformly dominates (19). That is, there is no
rival set of forecasts such that for some ε > 0 and every ω,
g0(X(ω), pX) +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)gj(X(ω), pj)
≥ g0(X(ω), qX) +
∞∑
j=1
Hj(ω)gj(X(ω), qj) + ε.
It is sufficient to show that
P
{
g0(X,qX) +
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,qj)−
[
g0(X,pX) +
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,pj)
]}
(35)
≥ 0.
Write the left-hand side of (35) as
P [g0(X,qX)− g0(X,pX)] +P
[
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,qj)−
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,pj)
]
.(36)
That the first expectation in (36) is nonnegative follows from the fact that
g is strictly proper. From the assumption that P satisfies the law of total
previsions in π,
P
[
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,qj)−
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,pj)
]
= P
[
P
[
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,qj)−
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,pi)
∣∣∣π
]]
.
Using equation (5) and the same logic as in part (3.1), we obtain, for each i,
P
[
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,qj)−
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,pj)
∣∣∣Hi
]
= P [Hi{gi(X,qi)− gi(X,pi)}|Hi]
= P [gi(X,qi)|Hi]− P [gi(X,pi)|Hi]
≥ 0,
where the final inequality follows because gi is a proper scoring rule and
P (·|Hi) is a finitely additive expectation for all i.
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Therefore, since P satisfies the law of total previsions in π,
P
[
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,qi)−
∞∑
j=1
Hjgj(X,pi)
]
≥ 0,
which completes the proof of (36).
Corollary 3 is equivalent to the claim that for each set of rival forecasts,
qX and {qj}∞j=1, the second prevision in (36) is nonnegative, which was
established in the proof of (3.2).
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Infinite previsions and finitely additive expectations
(DOI: 10.1214/14-AOS1203SUPP; .pdf). The expectation of a random vari-
able X defined on Ω is usually defined as the integral of X over the set Ω
with respect to the underlying probability measure defined on subsets of Ω.
In the countably additive setting, such integrals can be defined (except for
certain cases involving ∞−∞) uniquely from a probability measure on Ω.
Dunford and Schwartz [(1958), Chapter III] give a detailed analysis of inte-
gration with respect to finitely additive measures that attempts to replicate
the uniqueness of integrals. Their analysis requires additional assumptions
if one wishes to integrate unbounded random variables. We choose the al-
ternative of defining integrals as special types of linear functionals. This is
the approach used in the study of the Daniell integral. [See Royden (1963),
Chapter 13.] Then the measure of a set becomes the integral of its indicator
function. De Finetti’s concept of prevision turns out to be a finitely additive
generalization of the Daniell integral. (See Definition 10 in Appendix A.2.)
We provide details on the finitely additive Daniell integral along with details
about the meaning of infinite previsions and how to extend coherence1 and
coherence3 to deal with random variables having infinite previsions. Infi-
nite previsions invariably arise when dealing with general sets of unbounded
random variables.
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